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Notes
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OFDIVISIBLE DIVORCE-
EX PARTE DIVORCE AND RIGHT TO ALIMONY IN KENTUCKY
Introduction
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution1
as effectuated by Congress provides that:
[Rlecords and judicial proceedings ... shall have the same full faith
and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories
and Possessions as they have by Iaw or usage in the courts of such
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.2
This provision has led to a great mass of litigation. Especially
is this true in those areas of the law which reflect state policy con-
cerning matters of morality. Here, a judgment of a sister-state is
likely to run counter to some deeply entrenched public conviction,
preference or prejudice of the state asked to recognize or enforce
it. It often provokes the use of practically every conceivable pro-
cedure for evasion. Nowhere is this more true than in the field of
domestic relations.
The Supreme Court, of course, has often had to struggle with
these problems in an effort to balance the interests of various states.
The problem of reaching a satisfactory. solution of these conflicts
in the divorce situation has been greatly intensified by the ever-in-
creasing mobility of our population, the acceptance of women into
the labor force, the emancipation of women from their dependency
on the male, the growth of public assistance, and the lessening of
the social stigma attached to divorce. The easy divorce laws of states
other than the marital domicile are increasingly available to both
spouses wherever located. The wife can now more easily endure
being divorced and is therefore less likely to go to very great trouble
and expense to resist the husband's obtaining a divorce even when
he is not entitled to it.
But for one reason or another the wife frequently attempts to
re-litigate, in another jurisdiction, some aspect of a divorce obtained
by the husband. Most often the wife's interest is that of obtaining
alimony or property from her husband after he has obtained a di-
vorce. The purpose of this note is to discuss the efforts of the Supreme
I Art. IV, § 1.228 U.S.C. 1738 (1952).
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Court to find its way out of the maze of conflicts thereby created and
consider the effects of these cases upon Kentucky law as it exists.
The Development of the Divisible Divorce
It was early held 3 that a state having jurisdiction can grant a
divorce entitled to full faith and credit in other states even though
the grounds on which the divorce was granted are not recognized
as adequate in the state wherein the decree is questioned. This
jurisdiction may be based upon bona fide residence of only one of the
parties to the marriage, the non-resident party being served by
publication.4
Then came the now-famous case of Haddock v. Haddock5 in which
the Supreme Court upheld the New York Court's refusal to admit a
Connecticut decree into evidence on the grounds that the court
rendering it lacked jurisdiction. It was here that the Court formu-
lated a concept of divisibility; viz., divisibility of the res. Under this
theory, the marital status. itself was divided so that part of it followed
the husband into Connecticut, part remained in New York. That
part which followed the husband was a sufficient basis for the Con-
necticut court's jurisdiction to terminate the marital status there.
That which remained with the wife in New York was sufficient to
maintain the relationship in that state, even as to the husband. Under
this theory, jurisdiction to render a divorce decree entitled to full
faith and credit everywhere, came to depend upon marital domicile.
The location of the marital domicile depended upon which party was
at fault. The court could determine who was at fault if it had juris-
diction.6
The failure of this attempted solution was made quite clear in
Williams v. North Carolina (1).7 The Supreme Court denounced the
3 Cheever v, Wilson 76 U.S. (9 Wall) 108 (1869).4 In Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901), the husband, having ob-
tained constructive service on his wife, obtained a divorce on grounds that she
had deserted him by leaving Kentucky and returning to her former home in
New York/ When the New York court subsequently granted the wife a divorce
from bed and board and alimony in a suit instituted there by the wife, the
Supreme Court reversed saying, at page 173, that the Kentucky divorce was
"as binding as if she had been served with notice in Kentucky, or had voluntarily
appeared in the suit." (Emphasis supplied.)
But in Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901), decided the same day, the
opposite result was reached where it clearly appeared that the husband was not
a bona fide resident of the state in which he procured the divorce.
It is significant that in these cases the court treated the termination of
the status and termination of the right to alimony as standing or falling together.
5201 U.S. 562 (1906).6When the marital domicile was with the husband, he could obtain a di-
vorce which would cut off his absent wife's right to alimony. Thompson v.
Thompson, 226 U.S. 551 (1912). But in any event, the Haddock case permitted
the jurisdiction in which the wife sought alimony to re-litigate the question of
fault.
7317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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circuitous reasoning of, and expressly overruled, the Haddock case,
stating:
The existence of the power of a state to alter the marital status of
its domiciliaries, as distinguished from the wisdom of its exercise,
is not dependent on the underlying causes of the domestice rift. As we
have said, it is dependent on the relationship which domicile creates
and the pervasive control which a state has over marriage and di-
vorce within its borders.8
As the second Williams case9 illustrates, the decree may still be
attacked on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or fraud. But jurisdiction
ceased to depend upon the merits of the plaintiff's case in the orig-
inal divorce action.'0
The net result was that the Court, while insisting that full faith
and credit must be given to a sister-state ex parte divorce, could not
escape the conclusion that the state of the wife's domicile had a
serious and valid concern with the domestic relationship. The Had-
dock case had been an attempt to give effect to the full faith and
credit requirement in such a way that it would allow for balancing
the interest of the state of the wife's domicile in providing for her
support, and the interest of the state of the husband's residence in
having his status determined with finality. But the rationalization
used, the divisible res, led to the practical destruction of the full faith
and credit requirement. So the Court abandoned that rationale and
reverted, in Williams, to the rule as it existed before the Haddock
case.' Both positions were extreme and neither solved the basic
problem.' 2
In Estin v. Estin,13 the Court was again confronted with the
conflict between the interests of the state of the wife's residence and
the interests of the state of the husband's residence. The Court
there realized that the state of the wife's domicile had no valid con-
cern whether the marital status was continued or terminated. Its
interest was not in keeping the wife married. Rather, it was in having
her supported by her ex-spouse so as to prevent her from becoming
morally or financially destitute and a ward of the state. The wife
in that case had obtained an alimony judgment in New York while
8 Id. at 300.
9 325 U.S.226 (1945).10 But if the wife appeared even specially and contested the jurisdiction of
the court, then even that question could not be raised in the collateral attack.
Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Shearer v. Shearer, 834 U.S.343 (1948).
11 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901). For a discussion see note 4
supra.
12 For a very thorough analysis of the development (up through the over-
ruling of the Haddock case by the first Williams case) see, Strahom and Reiblich,
The Haddock Case Overrled-The Future of Interstate Divorce, 7 Md. L. Rev.
29 (1942).
1s334 U.S. 541 (1948). See annot., 1 A.L.R. 2d 1412 (1948).
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the marriage status still existed. The husband, who was personally
before the court in that action, left the state and obtained a Nevada
divorce based upon constructive service on the wife. When the wife
later brought an action to enforce the prior judgment, the husband
interposed his Nevada divorce. The New York court rejected this
defense and gave the wife relief. In affirming, the Supreme Court
said that the pre-existing judgment gave the wife personal rights
which, under New York law, survived the termination of the marital
status. It reasoned that the Nevada court could not terminate these
rights unless the wife were personally served in the action or ap-
peared therein.
The Estin case introduced the modem concept of divisibility.
Instead of dividing the res which formed the basis of a state's juris-
diction to terminate or give effect to the marriage so that the divorce
was either wholly valid or wholly invalid, depending upon which
state was attempting to question it, the Court divided the divorce
action itself. This gave recognition to the basically dual nature of
the divorce action. First, it ends the marital status itself and,
secondly, it adjudicates the wife's rights to alimony. But the Court
recognized that at common law these latter rights, though in per-
sonatn in nature, exist only so long as the status continues, unless
reduced to a judgment at the time of divorce. Thus, if the common
law prevails in the granting state so that the right to alimony termin-
ates with the marriage, then the full faith and credit provision
would normally seem to require that it be given the same effect in
another state wherein the decree was questioned. But, because of
the conflicting interest involved, the Court permitted an intrusion
upon the rule, limited to those cases in which the state of the wife's
domicile had already expressed its concern by (1) granting the wife
a judgment for alimony and (2) treating such judgment as surviving
the termination of the status.
The Court in the Estin case was approaching a rational and
practical solution to the problem of balancing between the interests
of the divorcing state, on the one hand, and the state of the wife's
domicile, on the other. But because of the two limitations mentioned
above, situations could arise in which the solution offered by Estin
would be inadequate. Such a case was Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt.14
In that case the husband and wife were domiciled in California at
the time of their separation. After their separation, he went to Nevada
and established residence. She went to New York (which may have
been her original home), but because of a one year's residency re-
14354 U.S. 416 (1957).
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quirement 5 could not file suit for alimony. The husband, under no
such limitation, obtained a divorce in Nevada which provided that
both husband and wife were "freed and released from the bonds of
matrimony and all the duties and obligations thereof."' The wife,
immediately upon the termination of her disability, but after the
divorce, brought suit for alimony in New York and attached the hus-
band's property there. Under the Williams case' 7 and Thompson v.
Thompson,18 it would appear that New York would be compelled to
give full faith and credit to the Nevada decree and deny relief to the
wife because she bad not reduced her rights to a judgment as re-
quired by the Estin case. It is obvious that to prevent such injustice
some extension of Estin was needed.
But the Court did not merely extend Estin. It said that the require-
ment of a pre-existing judgment, which was treated as of critical
importance in the Estin case, was immaterial. It further stated:
[T]he Nevada decree, to the extent it purported to affect the wife's
right to support, was void and the Full Faith and Credit Clause did
not obligate New York to give it recognition. (Emphasis supplied). 19
The issue actually before the court was whether New York had
to give the Nevada decree full faith and credit, or whether it might
give it only limited recognition in light of its paramount concern
with the divorced wife's position. As in Estin, some intrusion would
be made upon the full faith and credit provision if the wife
were allowed to recover. In Estin such intrusion was felt to be justi-
fied because New York, by giving the wife a judgment and treating
it as surviving the divorce, had evidenced a concern with the broken
marriage before Nevada had anything to do with it. How simply
the Court could have extended that case by holding that where a
state, by statute or otherwise, gives "spouses" there domiciled a right
to action which survives an ex parte divorce decree, the sister-state
decree cannot terminate those existing rights. This would have
adequately balanced between New York's interest and that of Nevada
and yet would have resulted in only slight impairment of the full
faith and credit provision. If the wife were domiciled in New York
at the time of divorce, she could bring the later action. If she did
not come into the jurisdiction until after the divorce, she would never
have been a "spouse" there and thus could not have qualified under
its law to recover alimony. In those jurisdictions which follow the
common law rule that the right to alimony ends with the termin-
'5 New York Civil Practice Act, § 1165-a.01In Nevada such a decree has the effect of denying alimony. Sweeney v.
Sweeney, 42 Nev. 431, 179 P. 638 (1919).
17817 U.S. 287 (1942).
18 226 U.S. 551 (1912). 19 354 U.S. 416, 419 (1957).
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ation of the marriage (unless reduced to a judgment at the time of
the divorce) the wife could not maintain a suit for alimony after an ex
parte divorce. This result would follow, not because the decreeing
jurisdiction purported to destroy these rights, but because the juris-
diction in which the divorced wife resides recognizes them only dur-
ing the existence of the marriage. In this way the Court could have
made each state supreme in that area which was of paramount con-
cern to it.
Admittedly, the Vanderbilt case is susceptible of the above inter-
pretation if limited to its facts. But the language of the Court to the
effect that the Nevada decree was void to the extent that it purported
to terminate the wife's rights to alimony leaves considerable doubt
about the limits of its application. If the language is construed liter-
ally, then, under Pennoy-3r v. Neff,2 0 Nevada could not enforce that
portion of its own decree as far as it affected the wife's right to
alimony.
We may safely generalize that, while an ex parte divorce decree
is void in so far as it purports to affect the wife's rights to alimony,
and property, the question can later be litigated only in those juris-
dictions which do not treat these rights as existing only during the
continuation of the marital status.
But the difficulty with this rule is that a state in which the wife
never resided, until years after the divorce, could give her a judgment
against the husband or his property even though such state had
never been concerned with the marriage. Conceivably, the husband
actually introduced evidence in the divorce action showing that the
wife was not entitled to alimony. Nonetheless, the wife can now wait
until such evidence has dissipated to bring her action and thereby
catch the husband defenseless. It may be that at the time of the
divorce he had little or no property. But the wife can wait years
until he amasses a fortune and then sue him.21 Such a result is
clearly inequitable and contrary to the policy of putting legal liabili-
ties to rest if not acted upon within a reasonable time.
The rule of the Vanderbilt case has also created doubts about
the legal consequences of certain situations in which there was for-
merly a great degree of certainty and predictability. Suppose a state
gave the wife a personal judgment for alimony before the divorce
and treated it as surviving an ex parte divorce. Then the husband
obtains an ex parte divorce in another state in which such judgments do
not survive. Is the divorcing state bound to enforce the judgment of the
2095 U.S. 714 (1877).
21 That the wife might wait years before bringing action is illustrated by
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
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first state? Or suppose she catches him in a third state? Would that
state be bound by the judgment of the first state or could it exercise
discretion as to which rule it would follow? Suppose the wife appears
specially and contests the jurisdiction of the rendering state to grant
the divorce. Is she then bound by a decree which purports to ter-
minate her alimony rights? Or because she made no general appear-
ance is it still void to that extent? Again, suppose that the jurisdiction
in which she seeks alimony treats the right thereto as surviving, ex-
cept where the wife is found to be at fault. If the ex parte divorce
was granted on the basis of the wife's fault, would that finding be
binding upon the state wherein the alimony was sought? Or would
it be a denial of due process to treat it as conclusive, since the wife
was not personally before the court? Or, would the second state have
discretion in determining how it should be treated? Time will prob-
ably reveal many other questions arising because of this decision.
It should also be noted that the Vanderbilt decision did not appear
to turn at all upon the fact that she had established her residence in
New York prior to the divorce. Is this fact critical, or do we now
have migratory alimony as well as migratory divorce?
The Vanderbilt case, like the Haddock case, in its attempt to
solve a social problem and balance the interest of various states,
created more and worse problems than it solved. This result is typical
of the experimental approach to the problem. The Court has vascil-
lated between the extremes represented by Atherton and Williams
on the one hand, Haddock, and now Vanderbilt, on the other. It is
certainly to be desired that the Court, having come so close to a
satisfactory solution to this problem in Estin, will not react from
Vanderbilt by returning to the Ath-,rton extreme. Rather it is hoped
that the court will take the first opportunity to find a workable solu-
tion somewhere between Estin and Vanderbilt by placing limits about
the latter case. Only in this way can it give effect to the full faith and
credit clause and yet justify, on policy grounds, some intrusion upon
that rule by those states having a legitimate concern with a par-
ticular domestic relation.
Effect of the Divisibility Concspt
In summary, under Supreme Court decisions the extraterritorial
effect of an ex parte divorce decree which purports to cut off the
absent wife's rights to alimony is somewhat hazy. But this much
appears certain: under the combined effect of William v. North Caro-
lina (I),22 Estin v. Estin2s and Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt24 a state must
22 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
23334 U.S. 541 (1948).
24 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
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recognize a divorce granted by a sister-state having jurisdiction over
the plaintiff by reason of his being a bona fide resident thereof. But
it need not recognize the decree insofar as it purports to end the
wife's rights to alimony if the state in which the decree is questioned
treats these rights as surviving the termination of the marital status.
The question immediately arising is, does Kentucky treat such rights as
surviving the divorce?
Effect of the Divisibility Concept on the Termination of Alimony
Rights in Kentucky
Generally, in Kentucky, the wife's right to alimony must be estab-
lished when the divorce is granted or else it is terminated. This rule
was established in Campbell v. Campbell.2 5 In that case the wife
brought an action for divorce and had a decree. At the next term of
court she attempted to assert a claim for alimony and enforce it
against the property of her husband who had since left the state.
The Court of Appeals held that her right ended with the divorce.
It based its decision, in part, upon its interpretation of a statute em-
powering the courts to allow alimony upon the granting of a divorce
to mean only upon the granting of a divorce where one was granted.26
The court said in the Campbell case:
While in this State alimony has not been regarded as an
incident of the divorce, this is true only where the marital relation
is continued. But where that relation is terminated without claim
or reservation in the judgment of divorce concerning future support
by way of alimony, all such rights of the parties must be deemed as
fixed and settled by the judgment.2 7
Dictum in the case of Logsdon v. Logsdon2s indicates that the
rule does not prohibit direct attacks upon denials or omissions of ali-
mony but only collateral attacks. In that case the wife attempted to
obtain a divorce and alimony in Edmonson County Circuit Court
alleging that the divorce obtained by the husband in McLean County
Circuit Court was procured through fraud. The Court of Appeals,
while sustaining the dismissal of the wife's action, pointed out that
she could obtain alimony in one of three ways: (1) by direct appeal
in the original action instituted by the husband, (2) by having the
decree set aside by the court rendering it and then counter-claiming
for divorce and alimony or (3) upon having it set aside, by bringing
a separate action in any other court which might have jurisdiction.
25 115 Ky. 656, 74 S.W. 670 (1903).
26Ky. Stat. § 2122 (1899). The provisions of the statute, indeed almost the
identical wording, are embodied in Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.060 (1) (1959).
27 115 Ky. 656, 659, 74 S.W. 670 (1903).
28 204 Ky. 104, 263 S.W. 728 (1924).
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The principle applied in the Campbell case 29 is equally applicable
where the wife seeks alimony in Kentucky after the husband ob-
tains an ex parte divorce in another jurisdiction. Thus, the court said
in Hughes v. Hughes, when such a situation arose:
A woman does not, by marriage, acquire any property
rights in her husband, as she would in a horse, when she buys it,
but she does acquire certain marital rights which are the basis of
her claim for maintenance, support, or alimony; but, when those
marital rights are destroyed, as happened here when the Illinois
court entered this decree of divorce, she has no further claims upon
the husband.3O
Exceptions
It is clear from these cases that Kentucky does not treat the right
to alimony as surviving a divorce decree. But there are at least two
exceptions to the rule which must be accounted for.
The first such exception appears in Lyon v. Lyon.31 There the
wife was permitted to bring a suit for alimony subsequent to the
divorce when the question had been specifically reserved in the
divorce proceeding.
The second exception can be illustrated by Hanks v. Hanks.32
There the wife sued for divorce but did not request alimony because
she had sufficient property of her own (but which had been deeded
to her by the husband during the marriage). When the husband
sued for restoration of the property the court upheld the right of the
wife to counter-claim for alimony since she had foregone those rights
in reliance upon her possession of the property in controversy.
Some Cases Distinguished
There is another class of cases which appears to abrogate the
general rule. But close scrutiny of these cases reveals that they do not
come under the rule at all. They do not involve survival of the right
to alimony as such. They turn upon fraud, statutory provisions, or the
fact that a Kentucky court had already obtained jurisdiction of the
alimony action before a foreign court rendered the decree of divorce
offered as a bar to the action for alimony.
Fraud, Misrepresentation, and Mistake
One of the clearest cases of fraud was the case of Asher v. Asher.33
In that case the husband filed, in the wife's name, a petition which
she had signed under duress two years earlier. The husband, appar-
ently by counterclaim, was awarded a divorce. The wife, upon dis-
29 See note 25 supra.
30 211 Ky. 799, 806, 278 S.W. 121, 124 (1925).
31248 Ky. 246, 47 S.W. 2d 1072 (1932).
32 282 Ky. 236, 188 S.W. 2d 362 (1940).
33249 Ky. 215, 60 S.W. 2d 592 (1933).
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covery that she had been divorced, petitioned to have the decree
set aside and for divorce and alimony. The trial court found that
upon the evidence the husband was not entitled to a divorce but
that the wife was. However,, because of the nature of a divorce,3 4
the court would not set it aside but did allow alimony. Upon appeal
by both parties the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's
action. In Hughes v. Hughes,3 5 the court indirectly upheld the wife's
right to alimony, even after a final divorce, where the court found
that the husband had induced the wife not to appear and contest
the action with assurances that he had withdrawn the action. The
court held that the giving up of her rights to secure alimony after a
divorce fraudulently obtained by the husband was sufficient con-
sideration to support the husband's promise to pay her a stipulated
SUm.
Where the wife failed to raise the question of alimony because
of the honest but mistaken belief that she and her husband, through
their respective attorneys, had reached a compromise and formed
a contract, the court, in Reynierson v. Reynierson,3 permitted her
to bring the action separately after the divorce. Specific statutory
provision is made for such situations in Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 60.02, which permits a party to be relieved from a
judgment, order or proceeding for reasons of fraud, misrepresentation,
or other misconduct of the adverse party or for justifiable mistake.
But this relief is available only if the motion is made within a
reasonable time.
Statutory Provisions
In addition to the provision discussed immediately above there are
others which bear upon the question as to when a wife may enforce
her right to alimony after a divorce. One such provision is contained
in Kentucky Revised Statutes, section 28.035. Under it a Circuit Court
is impowered to reverse, vacate, or modify its own judgment or order.
But if the wife attempts to have a divorce set aside, she must show
fraud going to the jurisdiction of the court or else must act during the
term in which the divorce was granted and before the other party
has relied to his detriment.37 Otherwise she could only have it set aside
84 
"Decrees of divorce are given a special sanctity in Kentucky. They can
not be reversed by [the Court of Appeals] .. .KRS 21.060, and they can not be
reached by a motion for a new trial on grounds discovered after the term ..,.
nor by motion for a new trial by a defendant constructively summoned.
Kenmont Coal Co. v. Fisher, 259 S.W. 2d 480, 482 (Ky. 1953).
85 162 Ky. 505, 172 S.W. 960 (1915).
86 303 S.W. 2d 252 (Ky. 1957).
ST Busbong v. Bushong, 283 Ky. 36, 140 S.W. 2d 610 (1940); Crowe v.
Crowe, 264 Ky. 603, 95 S.W. 2d 251 (1936); Ramsey's Executor v. Ramsey, 283
Ky. 507, 26 S.W. 2d 37 (1930).
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to the extent that it denied alimony. In either case she would then have
to act within five years in order to obtain a divorce or alimony in her
own behalf. This follows from the provision that in seeking a divorce
she must allege that the cause of the divorce occurred within five
years next preceding the commencement of the action.38
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4.01, also offers relief to
the wife constructively summoned. Under it a party constructively
summoned, upon application to the court, shall be permitted to de-
fend within one year after judgment except in divorce cases. While
the decree of divorce itself may not be attacked, it would appear
that a denial or omission of alimony may be.3 9
Prior Jurisdiction of Kentucky Court
The recent case of Cooper v. Cooper"0 tends to cause confusion
as to what is the general rule in Kentucky as to the survival of the
right to alimony. In that case the husband obtained a divorce in
Florida in an action in which the wife appeared. During the sub-
sequent trial of the wife's suit for alimony in Kentucky, the husband
set up the Florida decree as a bar to the action. In spite of this, the
wife was awarded alimony and the Court of Appeals sustained the
award. But the important feature of that case was that prior to the
wife's appearance in the Florida suit she had already instituted her
suit in Kentucky, which suit was pending at the time the Florida
Court obtained jurisdiction over her. The court said that survival of
the wife's rights was not in question. It existed at the time when the
Kentucky suit was brought, the marriage not having yet been term-
inated, and Kentucky's jurisdiction was not destroyed by the Florida
decree. In addition, the court said:
Under ordinary circumstances, the Florida decree would be
conclusive of the question of alimony. Hughes v. Hughes, 211 Ky.
799, 278 S.W. 121. A principle peculiar to Florida law, however,
creates a distinguishing feature necessitating a result contra to that
obtained in the Hughes case, supra... The effect of this [Florida]
decision is to render the determination of fault upon the part of a
defendant wife inconclusive of her right to alimony. . . . If the
Florida decree would not have precluded the appellant's seasonable
demand for alimony there, it should not preclude it here.41
The Cooper case was cited as authority for a similar holding in
Taylor v. Taylor.42 There the wife had already instituted her suit
3SKy. Rev. Stat. § 403.035 (3) (1959). See also Honaker v. Honaker, 218
Ky. 212, 291 S.W. 42 (1927), which involved an earlier form of this statute.
39 This interpretation was applied in Asher v. Asher, 249 Ky. 215, 60 S.W.
2d 592 (1983) and Honaker v. Honaker, 218 Ky. 212, 291 S.W. 42 (1927), and
see dictum to that effect in Logsdon v. Logsdon 204 Ky. 104, 263 S.W. 728
(1924).403 14 Ky. 413, 234 S.W. 2d 658 (1950).
41Id. at 417, 234 S.W. 2d at 660. 42242 S.W. 2d 747 (Ky. 1951).
[Vol. 47,
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for alimony when the husband filed suit for divorce in Nevada. Again
the court pointed out that:
Appellant's [wife] action was instituted in Kentucky during
the existence of the marriage relation and before Nevada had any
concern over it. Jurisdiction of the Kentucky court over the subject
matter of the action continued notwithstanding the subsequent
granting of the divorce to appellee [husband] in Nevada.4 3
Another case of like import is that of Davis v. Davis44 which dif-
fered from the Taylor case only in that the wife's action had been
stricken from the docket (with leave to re-instate on motion) be-
fore the husband obtained the Nevada divorce. It was reinstated
after the divorce and proceeded to a judgment which was upheld on
appeal.
It is important to distinguish this type of case from those in which
Kentucky had never taken cognizance of the wife's right to alimony
until after a decree of divorce had been entered in another jurisdic-
tion as in the Hughes case.45
Summary
The general rule in Kentucky is that an action for alimony can-
not be brought by a wife after the marriage has been terminated.
However, when the right has been specifically reserved or is sought
to be exercised as a counterclaim to the husband's suit for restoration
to him of property held by the wife, she may prevail. In addition,
if the husband has fraudulently obtained a divorce to which he was
not entitled, or has fraudulently prevented the wife from defending
the suit, she may attack it in the court where rendered or by direct
appeal (subject to procedural limitations). The same is true where
the wife failed to raise the question of alimony due to a justifiable
mistake concerning a compromise agreement. Or, if the decree was
rendered on constructive service, she may, within one year and on
motion to the court in which it was rendered, appear and defend.
Finally, if she institutes her action before the decree of divorce is
rendered in another state, she may pursue it to a judgment.
The important thing to note is that only three of these exceptions
and distinctions could possibly aid a wife divorced by the courts of
a sister state. It is clear that the rule of prior jurisdiction by a Ken-
tucky court will. It is conceivable that the rule as to specific reser-
vation of the question might, though the Cooper case is the closest
thing to a holding that can be offered. It is also conceivable that a
wife divorced by an out of state decree might be able to take ad-
43 Id. at 749.
44 303 S.W. 2d 256 (Ky. 1957).
45211 Ky. 799, 278 S.W. 121 (1925).
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vantage. of the rule permitting the right to alimony to be asserted
as counter-claim to a husband's action for return of property pre-
viously conveyed to the wife. However, the Hanks case,40 which
established that exception, did so on the basis of her reliance upon
such ownership and her failure to raise the question as a result of
such reliance. In addition, that case involved a suit initiated by
the wife.
Conclusion
It would appear that under the Supreme Court decisions dis-
cussed previously, a wife who suffers a divorce obtained in another
jurisdiction by the husband on constructive service could not, or-
dinarily, obtain an award of alimony in Kentucky. This result fol-
lows, not from any purported termination of these rights by the
decreeing state, but from the fact that these rights ordinarily cease
to exist in Kentucky after the termination of the marital status.
But Kentucky husbands who are deserted by their wives and who
have obtained Kentucky divorces may not have similar protection
in other jurisdictions. The deserting wife could go to New York and
there attach property which the husband might own in that state
(e.g., stock in a New York corporation) or secure personal service on
him there and get an award of alimony. It is problematical whether
Kentucky would enforce such a judgment rendered on personal
service. It is certain that whether Kentucky would be required to
enforce it has not yet been determined by the Supreme Court. This
is one of the important questions left undetermind by the Vander-
bilt case.47
Two inequities are inherent in this situation. First, a Kentucky
wife who is unjustifiably divorced by her husband in another juris-
diction is left without means of obtaining support from him in this
state. Secondly, a Kentucky husband, who justifiably obtains a divorce
here against a wife no longer resident, may, years later and in an-
other state, be compelled to support her long after his evidence of
her infidelity or wrongdoing has ceased to exist. The first of these
inequities could be remedied by a Kentucky judicial decision or a
statute making the right to alimony survive an ex parte decree. The
second inequity can only be remedied through restricting the Vander-
bilt case by Supreme Court decision or a federal statute further
implementing the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution.48
James H. Byrdwell
46 See note 32 supra.
47 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
48 Art. IV. § 1.
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